AUGUST 2007 ISSUE No. 68

Welcome to the August 2007 edition of
Business Leasing and Finance News

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FOUNDER'S NOTE
By David G. Mayer

I am pleased to announce that BLFN now has its own mini-site at www.pattonboggsblfn.com. With the growth of BLFN’s readership and improvements in our technology, we will now be able to provide you with greater access to our content, after a transition period during which:

• The past issues from 2002-2005 will be added to the site database.
  
• All redirected links from the old URL and other URLs will be activated during the next month.
  
• In the BLFN issues prior to 2006, all links referring to other BLN article will be removed, so just search for the article name you want on Google or your favorite search engine.

We may need to take a full look at the BLFN homepage and revise some of the text. Please provide us with your requests and suggestions on our home page as we continually evaluate and upgrade the look and feel of BLFN.

Feel free to contact me by telephone at (214) 758-1545 or e-mail at dmayer@pattonboggs.com to discuss BLFN’s topics, mini-website or other issues affecting your business.

1. Supreme Court Paves Way for Billions of Dollars of New Lawsuits for Cleanup Costs

The decision in United States v. Atlantic Research Corporation, 127 S.Ct._____, 551 U.S. ____ (2007), No. 06-562 (June 11, 2007) will potentially unearth billions of dollars in new environmental lawsuits. In this unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that a private party seeking to clean up land contaminated by hazardous substances has an effective judicial remedy under federal law.

This right is available even if no federal or state governmental agency brings an enforcement action. The decision puts to rest an issue that has been controversial -- and unsettled -- since the 1980 enactment of the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §9601 et seq. It also opens the way for billions of dollars of payments by the federal government for actions of the military and other federal agencies.

Atlantic Research Operations

Atlantic Research Corporation (Atlantic) retrofitted rocket motors for the United States from 1981 through 1986 at a facility in Camden, Arkansas. As part of this work, high-pressure water spray was used to remove the old rocket fuel. The old propellant was removed, collected and burned. The residue from this burning contaminated the soil and groundwater. Atlantic voluntarily investigated and cleaned up the contamination, incurring significant costs. It subsequently sued the United States seeking to recover some of these costs.

Thousands of Similar Situations

Hundreds of similar cases have been filed around the country. Thousands of un-filed similar claims also exist. Many of them involve claims against the United States brought by manufacturers instrumental in the massive and rapid industrial mobilization that occurred during World War II and in the Cold War that followed it. The United States was intimately involved in this mobilization, allocating critical materials for production and at times deciding key issues of waste disposal at specific factories. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 29 F. 3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (government dictated details of production of high-tenacity rayon for tires during WWII). The direction was particularly true in the case of nuclear weapons production. The military also contaminated many of its bases during the course of the operation and maintenance of military equipment ranging from ships, to aircraft, to rifles.

Commercial Realities of High Clean Up Costs

Substantial controversy and litigation have arisen about financial responsibility for these cleanup costs and how the costs should be allocated. The commercial real estate market has factored in these costs. However, the market must still cope with uncertainties about the extent and sources of underlying contamination, timing of cleanup, cleanup standards and allocation of financial responsibility. The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state agencies, and local regulatory authorities have all tried to protect the public from such contamination, but have often done so in ways that have resulted in years of delay and uncertainty about resolving cleanup obligations. As a result, lenders, developers and other stakeholders have not, during CERCLA’s reign, been able to complete transactions at all or as simply as possible that involve contaminated property. This outcome has occurred even though not warranted by the likely cleanup costs.

In most cases, the federal and state governments have successfully insisted that all parties who ever owned or ever occupied a piece of contaminated property faced retroactive, strict, joint and several liability. This situation meant that all these parties potentially faced the full clean-up cost of contaminated property, regardless of how fleeting or inconsequential their involvement was with that property or with any waste disposed on the property. Consequently, providing for an effective judicial resolution of financial responsibility among responsible parties has become critical.

*Technical Point: CERCLA is written as a strict liability statute, which means that a person can be liable without fault. Subject to very few defenses, section 107(a) makes current and past owners of contaminated property, current and past “operators” of contaminated property, and those who “arranged for disposal” of hazardous substances at a property, all potentially liable for all the costs of responding to (cleaning up) such hazardous substances.

When first enacted in 1980, CERCLA did not contain a specific contribution provision, though some courts held that a party which was partially responsible for contamination at a site could bring a CERCLA cost recovery action under section 107(a) of CERCLA. See City of New York v. Exxon, 633 F.Supp. 609, 615-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (allowing City to sue industrial parties whose wastes had been dumped at City landfills without the industrial parties’ knowledge).

In 1986, Congress amended CERCLA and added a specific contribution provision, section 113(f). After the amendment, most federal courts held that a party who was partially responsible for contamination at a property could only bring a contribution action and could not maintain an action under section 107. This case law trend substantially restricted recoveries to parties undertaking voluntary cleanups, as the courts subsequently held that a party could not recover attorney’s fee while successfully bringing a contribution action, Key Tronics Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 114 S.Ct. 1960 (1994), and could only recover from another party once the plaintiff had paid more than its “fair share.” Atlantic Research, No. 06-562, slip op. at pp. 8-9; United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d 1, 47-49 (1^st Cir. 2001) (discussing fair share and contribution).

In 2004, the Justice Department reversed its long-standing position on these issues, essentially opposing contribution claims without related civil actions. It urged the Supreme Court to hold that no contribution claim could be brought under section 113(f) in the absence of a civil action under sections 106 or 107. Courts had held that claims under sections 106 or 107 could only be brought by the federal or state government. In Cooper Industries v. Aviall, 543 U.S. 157, 125 S.Ct. 577 (2004), the Court agreed, but declined to address the related issue of whether a potentially responsible party might instead have a claim under section 107, as some courts had held before section 113 was enacted in 1986.

As a result, a serious question arose as to whether a party conducting a voluntary cleanup in the absence of enforcement litigation had any effective federal judicial remedy to force other responsible parties to help pay for such cleanup.

*Insight Point: These uncertainties created problems in negotiating voluntary cleanups with the EPA as well as with states and private parties. The problem became particularly pronounced in connection with federal property because the Justice Department refuses to file suit for EPA against another federal agency for cost recovery.

Since the 2004 Aviall decision, several Courts of Appeal reconsidered the earlier line of cases limiting private parties to contribution claims. In doing so, the appellate courts focused on whether responsible parties could bring some action under section 107. Slip Opinion p. 3, Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F. 3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005); Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F. 3d 824 (7^th Cir. 2007). At least one circuit, however, accepted the reading of CERCLA urged by the Administration, effectively leaving many parties without any effective judicial remedy. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F. 3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded, 551 U.S. _____ (2007) (cleanup costs for defense production during WWII and aftermath). In Atlantic Research the Supreme Court resolved this split among the Circuits.

Federal Judicial Remedy for Private Party Environmental Cleanups Confirmed

The issue presented in the Supreme Court can be simply stated:Does CERCLA provide a federal judicial remedy for a party conducting a voluntary cleanup of hazardous substances in the absence of enforcement action under CERCLA by the EPA or a state agency?

The Supreme Court answered “yes” to this question when it affirmed the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit held that section 107(a) of CERCLA authorizes cost recovery by a private party conducting a voluntary cleanup, even in the absence of EPA or state enforcement action. This right exists under section 107(a) even if the party bringing the suit is also partially responsible for the contamination. The Court indicated that the contribution provision may come into play in counterclaims and in the allocation of the cleanup costs.

*Technical Point: The Court stated that this remedy overlaps with, but is distinct from, the contribution remedy in section 113(f). The practical significance of the differing remedies includes different statutes of limitation and potentially different measures for recovery.

Real World Significance of Decision

This decision is a significant help to landowners voluntarily cleaning up environmentally distressed property. It will allow them to recover some cleanup expenses for existing contamination caused in whole or in part by others. It should enable some lenders, lessors, developers and other stakeholders to proceed with transactions where expected cleanup costs or potential clean up costs thwarted or stopped an otherwise sound transaction.

*Tip: If you have a claim, keep an eye on the statutes of limitation, the time to file your claims. You should probably file under both sections 107 and 113, if possible, within three years of its accrual to avoid the unresolved question of the applicable limitation under section 113 and section 107, which allows claims during a six-year statute of limitation. (The accrual dates also differ.) Note that the case law is unclear as to which statute of limitation should govern in a case of overlapping claims, or whether one governs for one kind of expense and the other for a different kind of expense.

The decision is also likely to increase the number of such lawsuits, particularly where the federal government has potential liability for contamination. Because of Aviall, many such cases were either stayed or not filed, until the uncertainty about a federal judicial remedy was resolved.

*Warning: The Court’s decision affects almost every commercial and industrial real estate contract. It also leaves unsettled many related legal issues such as:

• How should the courts allocate liability among parties?
  
  

• Who bears the risk if a responsible party is unable to pay the clean-up costs?
  
  

• Are cleanup settlements for a site really final for a settling party if they don’t include all of the parties?

Three Deal Steps in Real Estate Land Transactions

If you lease, finance or purchase real estate, consider the following actions, based on the Atlantic Research decision:

• Expand environmental due diligence. Under CERCLA section 101(20), a party who conducts effective pre-transactional environmental due diligence (as defined by EPA regulatory standards) prior to buying real property may have a defense against CERCLA cost recovery claims, whether brought by neighbors, tenants, or prior or later owners. Consequently, full compliance with EPA’s All Appropriate Inquiry (AAI) standard is likely to become even more important. See 40 C.F.R. Part 312 (2006). That regulation relies upon the American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) standard for such work, ASTM 1527-05. It is important to comply with the most recent ASTM standard and do the work within six months before the closing, as required in the rule.

*Warning: Do not cut corners on environmental due diligence without fully evaluating the potential negative consequences of doing so and applicable responsibilities of the parties. See BLN Case & Comment: Lenders Affected When Purchaser Cuts Corners On Environmental Diligence – XDP, Inc. v. Watumull Properties Corp., By Russ Randle, Business Leasing News (Aug. 2004).

• Strengthen contractual language, as needed, when drafting lease, finance or sale documents, so the parties understand how the clean-up of pre-existing contamination is to be addressed, with special attention to waivers of CERCLA remedies, attorney’s fees, and indemnity provisions:

1. Draft explicit waivers of judicial remedies if that is the parties’ intent. Courts are likely to demand a very specific showing that a party has consciously waived such judicial remedies, similar to the great detail required for an effective jury trial waiver. Thus, a sale contract might have to recite that the property is purchased “as is, where is, with all faults,” with a full opportunity for effective environmental due diligence, and with full awareness of, and a conscious decision to surrender, the judicial remedies a party may have under CERCLA section 107, and equivalent state law, in the event contamination is later discovered at the property.
   
   
2. Negotiate an attorney’s fees recovery provision. Without it, private parties bringing cost recovery actions can not recover attorney's fees under Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 114 S.Ct. 1960 (1994).
   
   
3. Review indemnity provisions in land transfer agreement forms. These provisions will take on increased importance in light of the Court’s revival of private cost recovery claims under section 107. The judicial remedy provided by CERCLA is NOT a blank check for any remedial work the site owner or tenant wants to conduct. Rather, such work must conform to the National Contingency Plan, which includes a requirement that the public, including neighbors and other responsible parties, have an opportunity to comment on the proposed remedial work and its appropriateness. Thus, indemnity provisions will remain very important, as they may provide a broader remedy than section 107 claims or an exclusive remedy, depending on the wording.

• Hire seasoned environmental lawyers and field consultants to evaluate your transaction as early in a deal as feasible to assess potential environmental liability, the viability of lawsuits, if any, the potential for recovery of costs and the possibility of future liability on sale of the contaminated land.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Research should help protect landowners who find they hold property contaminated by others. Although it provides a new federal remedy for private parties, it is no substitute for making good business decisions about leasing, financing, developing or purchasing land. It fails to answer many of the questions that parties should negotiate in their real estate contracts. Yet, it resolves a long-standing controversy that should encourage parties to conduct cleanups and to close transactions that otherwise they may not have done. It also restores some fairness to this unsettled area of law, so that a party who voluntarily cleans up contaminated land is not left without a judicial remedy against those who helped contaminate the property that is restored to productive use.

Thanks to Russ Randle and a team of editors in the Environmental Law Group at Patton Boggs LLP for contributing this article.

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2. Top Five Ways to Prevent Unfair Debt Collection Suits in Texas

 As a lessor or a lender, collecting debts is just part of business. Everyone knows that bad debts and difficult debtors do arise, even in a good economy with low defaults rates, like today. But, even knowledgeable collectors do not realize that debt collection rules create a mine field of possible situations, where lawsuits can burst on to the scene.

To manage lawsuit risk and still recover debts, five steps may help lenders and lessors avoid claims of unfair debt collection in Texas (and elsewhere in the United States).

*Warning: An unfair collection claim can cost more in legal fees, management time and staff effort than the value of the entire outstanding debt. As a collector or department in charge of debt recovery, know the debt collection rules to avoid these bad results.

As the lender, lessor or other collector, consider five steps that may recover a debt and avoid unnecessary lawsuits:

1. Be prompt and thorough. Debt collection companies must provide written notification of the correct amount of the debt within five days of initially contacting the borrower. If a debt is contested, they must provide written proof or verification of the debt within 30 days.
   
   
   *Tip: Obtain verification of debts before pursing payment. Check for student and teaching deferrals. For instance, on June 6, 2007, the Attorney General of Texas, Greg Abbott, began legal action against IFC Credit Corp., an Illinois finance company, for attempting to recover fraudulently incurred debts from Texas small businesses and nonprofits for telecommunications services, debts which those people did not owe and which they were misled about. Other penalties and fines may also apply.
   
    
2. Be straightforward yet respectful. Disclose required information as the third party debt collector. Do not use materials such as surveys or questionnaires to obtain debtor information without clearly revealing the intended purpose. Do not harass borrowers verbally or physically. Do not make repeated phone calls at inconvenient times or places.
   
   
   *Tip: Never threaten borrowers or claim you can garnish wages. Under Texas law, the court recognizes a right of action for mental anguish alone. For example, the collection agency, Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act “by making telephone calls to debtors at inconvenient times, before 8:00 a.m. and after 9:00 p.m. … by making calls to the debtor’s place of employment after being told not to do so by the debtor or the employer…by contacting third parties about the debt without the consent of the debtor” U.S. v. Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 667 F.Supp. 370, 375 (N.D. TX 1986).
   
    
3. Be discrete about the debt. Do not involve or inform third parties of debt collection. You can be sued for damage to character and reputation. For example, in Peters v. Collision Clinics Int'l, Inc., 404 So.2d 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), the court held that creditor violated Florida debt collection statute by sending a letter to debtor's employer stating that employees had failed to pay their bills without disclosing the fact that the debt was disputed. In Public Finance Co. v. Van Blaricome, 324 N.W.2d 716 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982, the court found a violation of a Iowa debt collection statute where creditor informed debtor's relatives of debtor's debt and debt was disputed. Under the Texas Fair Debt Collection Act, a collector may not represent to any person other than the consumer that the consumer is willfully refusing to pay a debt, if the consumer has notified the debtor in writing that the debt is in dispute. (Tex. Fin. Code §392.310)
   
    
4. Be honest about the debt and your role. Misrepresenting who you are violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Pretending to be an attorney or to have legal expertise is illegal. Third party debt collectors must disclose that they are attempting to collect a debt and that any written information obtained will be used to do so. This must be done in initial and all subsequent communication. Further, misrepresentation of the nature of, amount of or consequences of not paying off the debt may be grounds for a lawsuit.
   
   
   *Tip: Stick with the facts and not the consequences in your communications. “I thought I had heard it all,” said John Fugate, a Texas consumer attorney. The debt collector “told the nine-year-old child of my college friend, who is the victim of identity theft, that they were going to take her mommy away forever.” (Consumer Affairs, June 12, 2007)
   
    
5. Do not collect more than is actually due. Do not deposit post-dated checks early. Do not do or threaten to do anything that is not legally in your power.
   
   
   *Tip: Confirm that the amount due is not usurious or more than is due. In the case of Green Point Credit Corp. v. Perez, 75 S.W.3d 40 (Ct. App. San Antonio. 2002), the debt collection company illegally threatened to jail Ninfa Perez for failure to pay much more than was due for a debt. Taken to court, Green Point had to pay Ms. Perez $5 million in actual damages.

Simply put, the easiest way to avoid a lawsuit is to follow the rules set out in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Texas Debt Collection Act.

Thanks to Jennifer L. Keefe of the Patton Boggs LLP Litigation and Dispute Resolution Group in Dallas for contributing this article.

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3. Entertainment Use of Business Jets Is No Free Lunch Under Proposed Tax Regulations

If you are a “specified individual” who flies in private jets, the IRS may deny your tax deductions for “entertainment” use of your aircraft.

The Treasury Department and IRS published proposed regulations on June 15, 2007. The regulations implement the provisions of section 274(e)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code denying deductions for entertainment use of business aircraft by “specified individuals.” The proposed regulations largely follow Notice 2005-45, which provided preliminary guidance on section 274(e)(2), but they make a few significant changes. Taxpayers may rely on the rules in the proposed regulations or those in Notice 2005-45 for the years beginning before the final regulations are adopted.

The preamble to the proposed regulations provides some helpful guidance on how the rules work. The new disallowance rules apply only to entertainment use. Entertainment use does not include travel for reasons such as attending to business other than that of the employer (e.g., board of directors meetings of another company), medical purposes, attending funerals, and participating in charitable activities.

*Warning: A "specified individual" may be required to recognize income if he does not reimburse his employer for the fair market value of a personal “non-entertainment” flight.

The proposed regulations provide guidance on the allocation of expenses when companies charter their aircraft to third parties.

Key Concepts

Some of the key provisions and concepts in the proposed regulations:

• Allow expenses to be allocated first to flights and then to passengers on the flights.

*Technical Point: Under this method, a taxpayer aggregates the expenses for an aircraft for a tax year, divides the total amount of expenses by flight hours or flight miles and then allocates costs to each flight based on its flight hours or flight miles. The expenses of a flight are allocated to passengers on a per capita basis.

A taxpayer may choose instead to allocate expenses for its aircraft on an occupied-seat-mile or hour of flight time basis.

*Tip: The new approach will be beneficial to a company if entertainment travel often occurs on flights that also carry passengers for non-entertainment purposes and/or passengers that are not specified individuals or if entertainment flights tend to have more passengers than business flights.

• Take into account depreciation in determining the operating costs to be disallowed.

*Technical Point: The proposed regulations permit taxpayers to elect to calculate depreciation for these purposes on a straight-line basis over the class life of an aircraft (generally six years) for all of the taxpayer’s aircraft for the year of the election and future years. A taxpayer that makes this election may claim accelerated depreciation (or bonus depreciation, if available) for purposes of computing tax liability. The proposed regulations clarify that depreciation denied by reason of section 274(e) does not reduce the tax basis of the aircraft. Therefore, the taxpayer may be able to recover the “lost” depreciation when the taxpayer disposes of the aircraft.

• Relax the fringe benefit consistency rules to permit taxpayers to value entertainment use of aircraft by "specified individuals" under the fair market value method but value the flights for other employees and specified employees not traveling for entertainment using the Single Industry Fare Level (SIFL) formula or general fair market value. See Basics: Personal Use of Business Aircraft, National Business Aircraft Association.

*Tip: This rule allows a company to shift a portion of the burden of section 274(e) to "specified individuals" (through increased income for individuals and, therefore, a decreased disallowance for the company) without having to give up use of the beneficial SIFL formula for flights to which 274(e) does not apply.

Additional Calculation Issues

The proposed regulations provide additional guidance on the treatment of deadhead flights. Notice 2005-45 allows taxpayers to aggregate the expenses of aircraft of similar cost profile when calculating disallowances. The proposed regulations provide additional guidance on similar cost profiles.

*Technical Point: If the Notice and the proposed regulations include different rules on the same issue, the taxpayer may follow either rule, but the taxpayer may not rely on the absence of a rule in the Notice to apply a rule contrary to the proposed regulations.

The preamble indicates that Treasury and the IRS are considering whether the regulations should permit taxpayers to determine the amount of their expenses paid or incurred for entertainment flights by reference to charter rates. The charter rates would be the undiscounted charter rates that a person would pay in an arm’s length transaction to charter the same or comparable aircraft. The proposed regulations do not include the charter safe harbor, but the preamble invites comments on whether the safe harbor or other safe harbors should be adopted. The preamble also asks about the availability of “substantiated actual, published, undiscounted charter rates charged to the general public.”

*Action Point: The IRS has scheduled a hearing on the proposed regulations for October 25, 2007. Comments need to be submitted to the IRS in advance of this date.

Thanks to George Schutzer, Co-Chair of the Tax Department at Patton Boggs LLP for contributing this article.

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4. BLFN's Leasing 101: What is the “Time-Price Differential”?

The “time-price differential” refers in general to selling property or services over time at a higher price than the actual cost of the service or property alone, as compensation for taking payment over a period of time instead of up front. In other words, it is the difference in amount between paying cash up front and paying with credit for the item over time.

*Technical Point:The “time-price differential” has been defined by statute in Texas, for example, to mean an amount (regardless how a financing document describes it) that is: (A) added to the price at which a seller offers to sell services or property to a purchaser for cash payable at the time of sale; and (B) paid or payable to the seller by the purchaser for the privilege of paying the offered sales price after the time of sale. See Tex. Fin. Code Ann. §301.303(b).

For example, say a “lessee” buys a tractor for $1,220,000 and "leases" it from the dealer but actually pays the purchase price over an agreed time period. If the lessee pays cash, the price of the tractor is $1,100,000. Because the lessee pays an additional $120,000, the extra cost could be treated as a finance charge under a sales contract at the interest rate implicit in the sum of $120,000 of extra charges. It is the difference between a cash and credit purchase.

The time-price differential may enable a lessee to assert that the seller/lessor has charged too high an implicit rate of interest on the finance charge (the $120,000), in violation of usury laws. To combat this assertion, consider the following three steps:

• Evaluate usury, sales and leasing laws in your jurisdiction to assure that the transaction is not subject to usury restrictions or limits on implicit interest rates; and that the time-price differential will not be treated as interest under the local usury laws;
  
  
• Disclose in your lease the time-price differential; and
  
  
• Add precautionary language in any event that the rates and amounts included in the price or charges will in no event exceed the highest rates of interest permitted by applicable law, which could read:

If for any reason the charges or amounts payable under this Lease are treated as a sale based on a time-price or price-time differential, the rate charged will equal the fixed Lease payment times the number of Lease payments during the Lease term, as set forth in the applicable Schedule, including any implicit financing amount, plus the costs of any purchase option in this Lease. By executing this Lease and/or any Schedule, Lessee has elected to purchase the Equipment for that time price and acknowledges its cost includes a financing component Lessor and Lessee agree that in no event will any time price or financing component be higher than the highest rate permitted by applicable law.

Paying for an item of equipment or other personal property, or even a service over time, at a credit price (instead of for cash) could qualify the deal as a time-price differential transaction. If the transaction is subject to usury rules, take care to make sure the implicit rates do not exceed the lawful limits in the affected jurisdictions.

*Tip:As a seller/lessor, argue that the sales under the time-price doctrine do not constitute loans, but rather a deferred purchase price, that is not subject to any usury laws which regulate payment of interest at rates higher than permitted by law.

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About Patton Boggs LLP; Publications

Patton Boggs LLP is a law firm of more than 500 attorneys and other professionals located throughout the United States and internationally in Doha, Qatar.

Patton Boggs has major practice areas in Business, Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and Litigation. These areas are composed of many practice groups designed specifically to meet client needs and the trends in developing legal markets. David G. Mayer often focuses on aviation, power, transportation, infrastructure, and technology matters.

The firm provides a broad array of skills in domestic and international business transactions, including equipment finance and leasing, corporate finance, secured transactions, syndications, mezzanine finance, federal leasing, project finance, real estate, health care, pharmaceuticals, technology transactions, and public policy work.

Publications

The following list offers a sample of articles by David G. Mayer:

• Managed Service Providers Use Innovative Capital Structures to Fund CAPEX, Financier Worldwide, by David G. Mayer (May 2007).
  
  
• The USA PATRIOT Act Renewed: Reassessing Money Laundering Risk in Finance Transactions, by Stephen J. McHale and David G. Mayer, LNJ Leasing Newsletter (Two Parts: Nov. & Dec. 2006).
  
  
• Unique Pad Gas Lease Supports Project Financing and Development of Gas Storage Facility in U.S., by David G. Mayer (with Fortis Capital Corp.), Asset-Based Lending Review, Financier Worldwide (Nov. 2006).

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Thanks to BLFN’s Team

I would like to thank BLFN’s team at Patton Boggs LLP. The team includes J. Atwood Jeter, a senior associate in the firm’s business transactions, real estate, and wind energy groups; the Patton Boggs staff editors, Paul Dumansky and Adrian Nicole McCoy; our Project Manager, Melissa Green; Claire Campbell; and our designers, Winston Jackson and Kiasha Sullivan. Thanks also to Douglas C. Boggs, a Business Group/Securities partner and web site reviewer for BLFN, and our Marketing Chief, Mary Kimber, for assisting BLFN through our firm’s editing, design, and posting process.All the best,

David

David G. Mayer
Founder: Business Leasing and Finance News
(formerly Business Leasing News)
Partner: Patton Boggs LLP
2001 Ross Avenue
Suite 3000
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 758-1545 (phone)
(214) 758-1550 (fax)

E-Mail: dmayer@pattonboggs.com

© David G. Mayer 2007

The “For Dummies” part of my book, Business Leasing For Dummies (BLFD)®, is a registered trademark of Wiley Publishing, Inc.